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Misreading the Erie Signs:
The Downfall of Diversity
By M.T. HERTz*
...

[T]he simple fact is that more and more, more federal courts

are being overruled by more state courts on local issues upon
which such federal courts have undertaken to read the Erie
signs....

1

Federal diversity jurisdiction is under attack-by the American
Law Institute,2 by legal commentators, and, most importantly,
by members of the federal judiciary4 who themselves doubt the
need for federal courts to continue to provide a forum for resolving
questions of state law. Yet the issue involves more than merely
whether the additional federal forum is needed. There is the
basic question of whether, under the reign of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,5 the federal courts can be truly consistent in providing a
"neutral" forum which neither attracts nor repels state law litigants. Erie neutrality is considered a keystone of diversity jurisdiction. If that neutrality is illusory, diversity jurisdiction may
J.D., 1970, Harvard. Mr. Hertz is a member of the Massachusetts and
Federal Bars, and is currently associated with Coudert Freres in Paris.
I W. S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp 388 F.2d 257, 264 (10th Cir. 1967)
(Brown,
d, 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
2 A J., concurring and dissenting), ree'
mmucAN LAw INsTrrurz, STUDY OF THE DIVsION OF JURISDICnON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969). See generally Field, Proposals on
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L.Q. 669 (1965); Wright Restructuring
Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 185 (1969).

3 E.g., C. Wmiarr, F a EanL COURTS § 23 (1970); Note, Federal Interpretation
of State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 MINN. L. REv. 806,
825 (1969).
4 Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 874, 875 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Lumberman's Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-60 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398
F.2d 885, 889 n.5 (5th Cir. 1968); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d
656, 658 (5th Cir. 1968) (Jones, J., concurring).
r, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case, 31 Ky. L.J. 99 (1943): Clark, State Law in Federal Courts:
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Note,
How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HAsv. L. REv. 1299 (1946).
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create a method for achieving different outcomes in state law
cases. The possibility of disparate results between forums would
roil the placid assumptions underlying arguments to continue
diversity jurisdiction.
To achieve "neutrality" in the application of state law, federal
diversity courts have tended to use "a pair of scissors and a
pastepot"8 and become mere annotators of state law- deviations
therefrom suffering the slings and arrows of even the most humble
judge.7 The exceptional federal court will go so far as to analyze
the very philosophy upon which the decisions of the state tribunals
are founded;8 however, most federal appeals courts abdicate such
efforts to the touchstones of orthodoxy in "finding" state law,
deferring to the words of even lower state courts9 or to the
federal district courts as being closer to the path of Erie righteous0
ness.1
Rote method, unfortunately, is not sufficient; of highest
priority is the ability (and the luck) to predict the state law
outcome. The Erie doctrine implicitly assumes that the federal
courts can find the state law consistently. However, the marksmanship of the federal courts is not notable for its accuracy, and,
even on purely legal questions, the diversity court is therefore
hardly a "neutral" forum.
I.
Williams v. United States" is illustrative. It involved a suit
under the Federal Torts Claim Act' 2 and, as such, was not
6 Corbin,

The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 775 (1941).
7 See, e.g., Tennessee Enamel Mfg. Co. v. Stores, Inc., 192 F.2d 863, 869
(6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952). Accord, Smoot v. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962).
8 E.g., Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. 1951).
9 West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1940). ..Compare Clark, State Law in Federal Courts:
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Thompkins, 55 YAL LJ. 267, 292 (1946)
and Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YAi.x L.J. 762, 766-70 (1941),
with Note, Federal Interpretationof State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope
of Inquiry, 53 MiNN. L. REv. 806, 812 n.31 (1969).
10 See Lomartira v. American Auto Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1967);
Delduca v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 357 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1966); Bartch v.
United States, 330 F.2d 466 (10th Ci. 1964); Campbell v. Village of Silver Bay,
315 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1963); Wisconsin Screw Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
297 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1962); Bower v. Bower, 255 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1958).
1435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970).
12 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
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maintainable in a state court. 13 No federal issues were presented;
rather, the outcome depended on the interpretation of the Rhode
Island wrongful death statute, 14 incorporated by reference into
the federal act.' 5 A nine-year-old boy, son of a Navy petty officer,
was taken to a Navy hospital where, due to the grossly negligent
diagnosis by the hospital, he died. The government admitted
liability; therefore, the sole question was the measure of damages
under Rhode Island law. Both parties agreed that the formula
for damages was expressed in McCabe v. NarragansettElectric
Co.:'(
...
the loss sustained by the plaintiff here is the present value
of the net result remaining after his personal expenses are
deducted from his income or earnings. To ascertain this it is,
of course, necessary first to ascertain the gross amount of such
prospective income or earnings; then to deduct therefrom
what the deceased would have to lay out as a producer to
render the service or to acquire the money that he might be
expected to produce, computing such expenses according to
his station in life, his means and personal habits, and7 then to
reduce the net result so obtained to its present value.3

The district court assumed that the boy would have become a
chief petty officer like his father, and used the salary for that rank
to compute the gross income over the deceased's working lifetime.
But, in computing expenses, the district court had relied on the
fact that the Navy pays its men a living allowance and assumed
that this allowance would cover the "personal expenses." Consequently, the lower court awarded damages based on the present
value of the cumulated full salary. The Court of Appeals for8
the First Circuit reversed on the matter of "personal expenses"'
because "by not deducting the cost of supporting the dependents
that an adult male may reasonably be expected to have," 19 the
district court failed to follow Rhode Island law.
Clearly, the McCabe case (referred to by the court of appeals
13 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
14 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-7-1 (1956).

28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).

1659 A. 112 (R.I. 1904).

17 Id. at 115.
18435 F.2d at 805 n.1, 806-07.
'9 Id. at 807.
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20
as McCabe I to distinguish it from the same case on rehearing)
did not intend the expenses of supporting a family to be considered as "personal expenses." The McCabe I court, after an22
nouncing its formula,2 ' cited cases from three other jurisdictions,
all of which rejected the inclusion of the cost of a family as a
"personal expense." But, on rehearing in McCabe II, the Rhode
Island court explained in greater detail that the suit was for the
benefit of the estate of the deceased, not for the survivors; therefore, the damages were for, and were to be measured by, the loss
resulting to the estate of the deceased.23 The Williams court
relied heavily on this use of the word "estate" as showing that
Rhode Island intended the recovery to be equal to probable
accumulations by the decedent.24
Although the word "estate" appears in McCabe II, there is
no indication that it was meant to modify the meaning of "personal
expenses" as used in McCabe 1.25 The McCabe II court plainly
intended to explain the difference between the Lord Campbell's
Act type statute (assessing damages to each beneficiary) and
the Rhode Island statute (assessing damages to the estate).
Aside from the use of the word "estate," there is nothing to
indicate that the McCabe II court meant for damages, as an asset
of the estate, to be measured by decedent's probable savings
rather than by a calculation of his net earnings. 6 In fact, there
20
McCabe v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 61 A. 667 (R.I. 1905) (hereinafter cited as McCabe II).
21 See text accompanying footnote 16 supra.
22 59 A. at 115, citing Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 163, 47
Pac. 1019, 1027 (1897); Central R.R. v. Rouse, 3 S.E. 307 (Ga. 1886); Ohio &
Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Voight, 23 N.E. 774 (Ind. 1889).
23 McCabe II, 61 A. at 670. See Read v. Dunn, 138 A. 210, 212 (R.I. 1927).
24 435 F.2d at 806.
25 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
26 The Williams court admitted that Rhode Island had never relied on the
term "accumulated estate" or "savings." 435 F.2d at 806 n.4. In point of fact, the
former term has never been used, whereas the latter appeared only in Gill v.
Laquerre, 152 A. 795 (R.I. 1931). In Gill the court held that inquiry as to what
a minor child would have been able to "save" as a teacher was improper, as there
was no way of showing that the child would have become a teacher. The Williams court pointed out that Gill did not criticize the concept of savings as supplying a measure of damages. A reading of the briefs in Gill shows that two unmarried teachers testified at the trial. Testimony by the first teacher was stricken.
Brief for Defendant at 4. Of the second teacher's salary, "approximately %was
used for living expenses, . . . and 34was saved." Brief for Plaintiff at 5. Under
the theory of the Williams court, defendant should have objected that there was
no proof adduced as to what the child would have spent on dependents, but did
not. Instead, defendant argued that "[tihere was, and of course could be no proof
of what little five year old Adelaide Gill would earn after majority or expend after
majority to produce her gross income." Brief for Defendant at 12.
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is every reason to believe that McCabe II was consistent with
McCabe I on this point. The McCabe II court noted that the
Rhode Island statute:
makes the amount recovered to be, as it were, assets of the
estate, to be distributed nevertheless arbitrarily as intestate
estate, even though the decedent should have left a last will
and testament whose residuary clause may have donated the
residuum of his estate to a charity, or even if he should have

deceased insolvent.27

It goes without saying that a decedent could go insolvent from
supporting his many dependents. 8
As the Williams court noted, McCabe and the cases which
follow it are entirely consistent with one another.29 A review of
the succeeding cases demonstrates that support of dependents
was not considered a personal expense in Rhode Island. The

clearest example is Underwood v. Old Colony Street Railway
Co.,0 in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
following jury instruction:
... in ascertaining the amount to be deducted for his personal
expenses, you should estimate what the deceased would have
to lay out for the rest of his probable life to support himself
according to his station in life, his means and personal habits,
counting in not only his purely personal expenses, as for
medical attendance, clothing, tobacco, and the like, but also
his fair share at least of the general expense of maintaining
the home where he lived in the style in which he was accustomed to maintain it, including in such general expense
food, fuel, wages of domestic servants and the like, and also
including a reasonable amount for what he would probably
have had to pay as rent for such a house as the one he lived
in if he had not owned it. After deducting the amount so
2

7McCabe II, 61 A. at 670 (emphasis added).

28The McCabe II court also cited a Pennsylvania case, Pennsylvania R.R. v.

Butler, 57 Pa. 335, 338 (1868), as defining the rule which should prevail on
damages. The rule was much the same as those cited by the McCabe I court, see
text accom anying note 17 supra, except that the statute was for the benefit of the
wife and I en directly and not for the decedent's estate. The survivors were
to get whatever they would have gotten from decedents personal efforts during
the remainder of his lifetime. A later statute followed the Rhode Island rule of
loss to the decedent. See Fisher v. Dye, 125 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1956); Murray v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 58 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1948).
29 435 F.2d at 806, n.3.
30 80 A. 390 (R.I. 1911).
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ascertained, you should reduce the net remainder to its present
value.31
Although the printed opinion notes that the 80-year-old decedent was survived by his daughter, only from reading the
briefs does one learn that one of the daughters lived with the
3 2 Furthermore,
decedent and that he provided her total support.
another daughter brought her children to live with the decedent
during the summer. 33 Neither of these expenses was included in
decedent's "personal expenses," as can readily be seen from the
holding that decedent need be allotted only his "fair share" of
household expenses, even though he paid for them all. Moreover, the Underwood defendant clearly accepted McCabe as
compelling this result, 34 and urged that decedent be allotted the
expense of half the household expenses after subtracting the
expenses incurred by the visit of the second daughter and her
children,3 5 nor did the defendant argue that the money which
decedent gave to his daughter should be termed his "personal expense."36
In Zanelle v. Pettine,3 7 which involved the death of a 14-yearold boy, the trial court was affirmed when it excluded questions
relative to the expenses of the boy's brothers for automobiles,
amusements, and tobacco, which defendant had asked in an
attempt to determine what the boy's own personal expenses
would have been when he reached age 21. The briefs show that
the only evidence as to income was that the father earned $30
weekly and the boy's brothers earned $25 to $40 weekly, whereas
decedent had still been in school. On the issue of expenses, the
evidence established merely that all the sons lived at home, and
that the ones over 21 paid the father $10 weekly for room and
board. One of the sons who was over 21 paid $200 annually for
other necessities, such as clothing. Defendant, referring to Underwood and McCabe,asked:
1Id.at 394.
Brief for Defendant at 4.
33 Id.at 138-39.
34Id. at 4.
32

Id.
Id.
37 155 A. 236 (R.I. 1931).
35

36
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Can anyone, from the evidence presented, say what it would
cost a person making $25 or $30 a week after he was married
38
and established his own home?

The implications of this question were obviously rejected by the
court when it upheld the verdict as being supported by the
evidence.3"
Any doubt concerning Rhode Island practice prior to Williams
was laid to rest by the reaction of the state legislature to the case.
Although the damages section of the death statute had remained
undisturbed since before McCabe, immediately after Williams
the Rhode Island legislature-for the first time-provided a statutory explanation of damages, and ignominously rejected the
Williams case.4 0

HI.
If Williams erred in interpreting state law, it was in good
company; such mistakes are common, as the federal courts have
often admitted41 and state courts have often charged.4 The
Brief for Defendant at 8.
155 A. at 238.
0R.I. GEN. LAvs ANN. § 10-7-1 .1 (Supp. 1972). PECUNIARY DAMAGESHow DETERMINE-Pecuniary damages to the beneficiaries described under §
10-7-2 of this chapter and recoverable by such persons shall be ascertained as
follows:
1. Determine the gross amount of the decedent's prospective income
or earnings over the remainder of his life expectancy, including therein
all estimated income he would probably have earned by his own exertion, both physical and mental.
2. Deduct therefrom the estimated personal expenses that the
decedent would probably have incurred for himself, exclusive of any of
his dependents, over the course of his life expectancy.
3. Reduce the remainder thus ascertained to its present value as of
the date of the award. In determining said award, evidence should be
admissible concerning economic trends, including but not limited to
projected purchasing power of money, inflation and projected increase
or decrease in the costs of living.
41 In addition to cases cited elsewhere herein, see, e.g., St. John v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 411 (1951); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232 (1944); Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928); Messinger
v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912); Wade v. Travis Co., 174 U.S. 499 (1899);
Morgan v. Curtenius, 60 U.S. (20 How.) 1 (1857); Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 595 (1855); Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847); United
States v. Morrison, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 124 (1830); B. F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis,
226 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1955); Jones v. Schellenberger, 225 F.2d 784, 786-87 (7th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956)- Madden v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 138 F.2d 708, 709 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 730 (1944); Toole
County Irrigation Dist. v. Moudy, 125 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 690 (1942); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 117 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1941).
38

439

(Continued on next page5
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record of the First Circuit is certainly no worse than the other
circuits; 43 in fact, it has tended to approach state law questions
with unusual caution. For example, in Miner v. Commerce Oil
Refining Corp.,44 the district court for Rhode Island held that a
malicious prosecution action based on misuse of process was
governed by a six year, rather than a two year, statute of limitations. The precise question had never been answered by the state
supreme court. After failing to convince the district court that
the action should be dismissed, the defendant brought a declaratory action before the state court. The federal district court enjoined the state suit, and the First Circuit reversed. Holding the
injunction "in all ways inappropriate," the court said that "[a]
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Laughorn v. Bank of America, 88 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S.
699 (1937); Groner v. United States, 73 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1934)- Trapp v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
597 (1934); Hubbell v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1934); American Surety
Co. v. Baers" Say. & Loan Ass'n, 67 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291
U.S. 678 (1934); Pacific Am. Fisheries v. Hoof, 291 F. 306, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1923),
cert. denied, 263 U.S. 712 (1923); Sanford v. Poe, 69 F. 546 (6th Cir. 1895),
affd sub nom. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897)- Louisvile & N.
R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 294 F. Supp. 894 (M.D. Tenn. 19665, aff'd, 389 F.2d
247 (6th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Jordan, 22 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Okla. 1938);
National City Bank v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 11 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Fla. 1934);
Tradesmen's Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 54 F.2d 367 (D. Md. 1931);
Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. v. Columbus Waterworks Co., 130 F. 180 (C.C.N.D.
Ga. 1903) Southern Ry. v. North Carolina Corp. Comm'n, 99 F. 162 (C.C.E.D.
1879);
N.C. 1900); Leslie v. Urbana, 15 F. Cas. 394 (No. 8276) (C.C.S.D. Ill.
Perrine v. Thompson, 19 F. Cas. 262 (No. 10,997) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879); The
Princess Alexandra, 19 F. Cas. 1335 (No. 11,430) (C.C.E.D. N.Y. 1879); Nessmith
18 F. Cas. 8 (No. 10,125) (C.C.D. Mich. 1848).
v. Sheldon,
42
E.g.,, Market Street Ry. v. State Bd., 137 Cal. App. 2d 87, 290 P.2d 20
(1955); Parker v. Parker, 270 A.2d 21 (Conn. 1970); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 133
So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961); Bauer Int'l Corp. v. Cragie's Inc., 171 S.E.2d 314 (Ga.
1969); Holland v. Froklis, 81 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. 1954); Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc.
v. Cummins, 146 N.E.2d 42 (IM. 1957) (decision of bankruptcy referee); Tate v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 240 P.2d 465 (Kan. 1952); New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 164 So.2d 300 (La. 1964); J. R. Watkins Co. v. Floyd, 119
So.2d 164 (Ct. App. La. 1960); Smithpeter v. Wabash R.R., 231 S.W.2d 135 (Mo.
1950); Simmons v. Friday, 224 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1949); Continental Motors Corp.
v. Muskegon, 112 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1961); In re Summitt and Elizabeth Trust
Co., 268 A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. 1970); River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp.,
133 A. 2d 373 (N.J. Super. 1957), aff'd, 144 A.2d 180 (N.J. Super. 1958); Kaiser
Steel Corp v. W. S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986 (N. M. Super. 1970); Mt. Pleasant
v. Patterson, 276 App. Div. 819, 93 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1949); Moore v. MacKay, 132
N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. v. Ferstman, 181 N.E.
499 (Ohio App. 1932); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Seelbach, 339 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.
1960); State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 165 S.E.2d 90 (W. Va. 1968); In re
Salvini's Estate, 397 P.2d 811 (Wash. 1964).
43 The Fifth Circuit has been particularly frank about its mistakes. See, e.g.,
United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1964)
(Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Hallatt, 326 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267,
269 n.1 (5th Cir. 1963); Andrus v. Hutchinson, 17 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1927).
44 198 F. Supp. 887, 894 (D.R.I. 1961).

DowNFArLL oF DivEnsrry

decision on pertinent state law is to be welcomed at any time," 45
and even suggested that the district court might stay the action
before it pending the state decision. This prudence was justified;
the state court found the two year law to be applicable.4 6
The Williams decision did not involve a novel point, but
rather one in which state decisions were available but unclear.
The question of whether dependents were to be considered a
"personal expense" had been previously entertained by the state
courts. However, the inconclusiveness of the reported decisions
required the federal court to divine the answer the state courts
would most likely select.
This need for weighing probabilities figured similarly in cases
47
involving New Jersey law. In Morrisville Trust Co. v. Moon,
the federal district court disallowed plaintiff's claim against an
insolvent estate on the authority of the New Jersey corporation
act, 8 which prevented corporate agents from conveying corporate
assets after insolvency. An exception was provided for bona fide
purchasers buying before the suspension of ordinary business.
The question before the court of appeals was whether this act
had been superseded by New Jersey's adoption of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act,49 allowing a bona fide purchaser
without notice to prevail even after the suspension of ordinary
business. The defendant argued that corporations were not covered by the latter act, since they were not mentioned in it. The
federal court of appeals disagreed, reading corporations into the
Fraudulent Conveyances Act through a general New Jersey statute
regarding statutory construction. Three years later, a New Jersey
lower court rejected the federal court's reasoning, noting that:
It is quite significant that the "Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act" has been in force in this state during more than a
decade, notwithstanding which the courts of this state during
this period have uniformly held that a conveyance by an insolvent corporation for an antecedent debt is void as against
creditors irrespective of notice of such insolvency. 0
45 Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1962).
46Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (R.I. 1964).
4721
F.2d 716 (3rd Cir. 1927).
4

8N.J.

STAT. ANN.

49 N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 14A:14-2 (1969).
§ 25:2-7 (1940).

G0 First Natl Bank v. Bianchi & Smith, 150 A. 774, 776 (N.J. Eq. 1930).
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The Third Circuit subsequently acquiesced in this ruling.51
The Williams court and the Moon court made similar errors.
Just as the latter ignored the fact that no state court had found
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act to overrule the earlier
act, so the Williams court ignored the significance of the fact
that the state courts had never dealt directly with the classification
of expenses of maintaining dependents.
An early example of misconstruction of a state statute is found
in Harris v. Runnells,52 in which the Supreme Court construed a
Mississippi slave statute5 3 involving certificates for slaves brought
into the state. In Harris, the defendant relied upon this statute,
arguing that the plaintiff could not recover upon defendant's note
"as it was given for an illegal consideration from the plaintiff's
having failed, before he sold the negroes, to comply with the
directions of the fourth section."54 The Court reasoned that,
since violation of the statute made plaintiff subject to a penalty,
the statute was intended to be penal only and not to invalidate
the underlying contract.55 The Court noted that "[wie are aware,
that decisions have been made in the courts of Mississippi seemingly in conflict with this; but they are only so in appearance
. . ,56
"
and even pointed out that subsequent legislation had
made contracts in violation of the statute void.
In Deans v. McLendon 7 the Mississippi High Court of Appeals and Errors rejected the Supreme Court's conclusion, cited
one of its own cases as clear precedent, and stated:
The rule recognized in Green v. Robinson has since been re-

peatedly affirmed by this court. It applies fully to the questions under consideration, which, indeed, could not, properly,
be considered an open question in this court.58
Since the court reporter in Harris did not show Green as being
cited by the parties, one wonders whether the Court either
misconstrued the meaning of Green or failed to take note of the
case at all. Federal courts have done both.
51

In re J. Rosen & Sons, Inc., 130 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1942).
53 U.S. (12 How.) 38 (1851).
53 Act of June 18, § 4 [1822].
54 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 41.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 43.
57 S0 Miss. 343 (1855).
58 Id. at 360.
52

19731
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As an example of the first type of problem, consider Gerr v.
Emrick.59 In Gerr,the Third Circuit held that, if the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was faced with the question, it would deny immunity in tort to the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission. The
court noted that six state lower courts had passed on the question,
and all six had granted immunity; conversely, three out of four
federal district courts had denied immunity. 60 The Third Circuit
relied heavily on Litchtenstein v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission.61 In an earlier case, PennsylvaniaTurnpike Commission
v. Smith,(2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had considered
whether the Commission was liable for interest on a condemnation
award for detention damages and held that it was not. Litchtenstein overruled Smith and held that the Commission would have
to pay such interest. The federal court of appeals interpreted
this as a determination that the Commission did not have the
sovereign immunity enjoyed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. But later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
Third Circuit had misinterpreted Litchtenstein, pointing out
that in a subsequent case the Commonwealth itself had been held
liable for interest on detention damages.6 3 Neither Litchtenstein
nor the succeeding case had imposed liability for tort, and
Litchtenstein did not deprive the Commission of the benefits of
sovereign immunity.
Federal courts have done worse than merely misinterpret
state cases; frequently they have failed to find them at all. In
Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Varone,64 the First Circuit
noted (in dictum) that "relevant pleadings are at the very
minimum conditionally privileged" against a libel suit, and cited
cases involving analogical situations to prove that Rhode Island
followed the general rule. Six years before, Rhode Island had
specifically decided that "libelous matters in pleadings filed in
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged where the statements are material, pertinent or relevant to the issues therein." 5
59 283 F.2d 293 (3rd Cir. 1960).
60 Id. at 294-95 nn. 4, 5 & 6.
61 158 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1960).
62 39 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1944).
63
Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 182 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1962). See
Wolf v. Commonwealth, 170 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1961).
64
803 F.2d 155, 160-61 (1st Cir. 1962).
6
5 Vierra v. Meredith, 123 A.2d 743, 744 (R.I. 1956).
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Fortunately, this failure to find the proper decision did not affect
the outcome of the case, as it once did in the Fourth Circuit. In
June, 1938, that court closed its term with a case involving the
question of whether heart failure in the course of a transfusion
constituted bodily injury by accidental means. 6 A search of the
statutes and decisions under the law of Virginia had produced
nothing bearing upon the issue involved, and the question was
answered negatively. Upon rehearing, the losing party presented
the court with a newly discovered case which redefined Virginia
law. The court then reversed its earlier position and affirmed the
67
lower court.
III.
Unfortunately, mere caution in approaching state law is not
enough. For example, where a state intermediate appellate court
has rendered an opinion on a point of law, the federal court is
required to follow it unless there is good reason to suspect that
the state supreme court would decide otherwise. 8 This rule,
while sensible enough as a rule of thumb, may easily lead to
mistakes. In a pre-Erie case, 69 the issue was whether the plaintiffs
suit, brought in February, 1874, was barred by Ohio's four year
statute of limitations. Plaintiff was a married woman, and the
statute of limitations, by its own terms, did not begin to run until
the "disability" of the married state was removed. However, in
April, 1870, Ohio enacted legislation permitting a married woman
to sue on her own behalf concerning her separate property. The
federal lower court followed the only state decision, rendered by
the Superior Court of Cincinnati, in holding that the Act of 1870
repealed the exception in favor of married women, and held the
four year statute of limitations to be fully applicable. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, because before review the Ohio
Supreme Court held that there was no bar until four years
after the passage of the 1870 Act, i.e., until April, 1874, three
70
months after the action was commenced.
66

American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Belch, 100 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1938).

67 Id. at 51.
68
West v. American
69

Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
Moores v. National Bank, 104 U.S. 625 (1881).
70 The Supreme Court no longer attributes such weight to state trial court
rulings. See King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1948).
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Similar problems arise where the state courts have never
interpreted a statute and consequently, the federal court is left
to its own devices. In Abraham v. National Bisquit Co.,7 1 the
question presented was whether a third party defendant inpleaded by the original defendant could be held jointly liable
to the plaintiff when the plaintiff had brought no action against
him. The Third Circuit had previously construed the relevant
Pennsylvania statute as forbidding joint liability,72 and the federal
district court had dutifully followed this construction in instructing the jury. After the judgment below, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania considered the statute for the first time and
reached a different conclusion. 7 The Third Circuit then had to
overrule both the trial court and its own earlier interpretation.
Where the state courts have not followed a settled rule, the
federal courts must still make a choice, and the chances for
mistakes are obvious.74 Yet ignoring dictum can be just as hazardous. In one instance, the Fifth Circuit had to decide whether the
failure of an insured to attend trial was prejudicial as a matter of
Florida law.75 The majority surveyed a number of Florida cases
which discussed the issue indirectly, but decided, over a strong
dissent, that the pronouncements in these cases were obiter dicta
which could be safely ignored. A retrial was ordered and, in
accordance with the majority opinion, the appellant prevailed.
However, less than a month after judgment was entered, a Florida
intermediate appellate court "categorically and by name" rejected
the opinion of the Fifth Circuit and "specifically adopted the
76
dissenting opinion as correctely enunciating the law of Florida."
Consequently, the federal court of appeals reversed its earlier
decision, admitting that "we were 'dead wrong"' and adopted the
77
view espoused by the dissent in the original appeal.
Even when the state law is settled, the federal court may find
89 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1937).
Yellow Cab Co. v. Rogers, 61 F.2d 729 (3rd Cir. 1932).
73 Majewski v. Lempka, 183 A. 777 (Pa. 1936).
74
See Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4
(1939), where the Supreme Court was forced to withdraw one opinion in the light
of a clarifying decision.
75 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hallat, 295 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1961).
76 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hallat, 326 F.2d 275, 276 (5th Cir. 1964). See
Barnes v. Pennsylvania Thresberman & Farmers Mutual Cas. Co., 146 So.2d 119
(Fla. App. 1962), cert. denied, 153 So.2d 305 (1968).
71
72

7 lp

at 277.
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that the state courts have not recognized an emerging trend. In
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,78 the federal court of

appeals affirmed an order of the district court dismissing, as
failing to state a cause of action, a petition in a suit by an
employee to recover damages for an occupational disease contracted as a result of the employer's negligence. The Ohio state
courts had consistently held that the state constitution and statutes
had withdrawn the common law right and denied any statutory
right to recovery for such diseases. 79 After the district court dismissed, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly overruled its earlier
decisions and declared that occupational diseases were comof the
pensable under the common law. 80 The Supreme Court
81
United States held that the new rule must be followed.
A subtler version of the same problem exists when the state
court has intimated one rule in dictum and has subsequently
changed its mind.82 On at least one occasion a state court has
abandoned one rule, announced a new rule, and then returned
to the previous rule, thereby catching the federal courts in a
judicial "double-take."83
The policies behind Erie conflict with the purposes of diversity
when a subsequent state case involves one or more of the parties
to the federal suit in situations where res judicata principles may
not apply. Prior to Erie, the Supreme Court recognized that
the very object of giving to the national courts jurisdiction
to administer the laws of the states in controversies between
citizens of different States was to institute independent tribunals which it might be supposed 84would be unaffected by
local prejudices and sectional views.

In one case the question of state law had been settled by the
highest state court and followed by the federal district court.
Then the state court, in a subsequent case involving one of the
parties to the federal suit, made an about-face on the issue. The
110 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1940).
79 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 540 n.4 (1941).
8o Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 20 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio
1939).
81311 U.S. 538 (1941).
82 See Metzger Motor Car Co. v. Parrott, 233 U.S. 36 (1914).
83 Connecticut v. Drew, 250 F. 852 (5th Cir. 1918).
84
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1882).
78
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federal court of appeals hastened to follow,8 very much in accord
with the Erie rules.8 Thus, the logical extension of Erie policy
seems opposed to one of the basic rationales for diversity jurisdiction.
The "mistakes" of the federal tribunals in applying state law
are not always to be laid at the door of the courts, but rather to
the occasional impossibility of interpreting unsettled, confused
or undetermined state policy. On the other hand, the federal
courts have, on occasion, studiously ignored state law in order to
achieve a more equitable result. In New York Times Co. v. Connor, 7 the Fifth Circuit ruled that no cause of action arose under
Alabama law where an alleged libel concerning an Alabama man
appeared in a newspaper primarily published and distributed in
New York. The federal court relied on Age-Herald Publishing
Co. v. Huddleston, 8 in which a newspaper published in Birmingham mailed copies to subscribers in nearby Blount County. The
Alabama Supreme Court held that venue was improperly laid in
Blount. Following dismissal in Connor, the Alabama Supreme
Court held, in now famous New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,89
that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly applied Age-Herald. The
state court pointed out that Age-Herald had been distinguished
as a mere venue case,90 and that the venue statute did not apply
when a foreign corporation had not qualified to do business in
Alabama.
In political cases such as Connor and Sullivan, it is hard to
say whether the federal court misread the state law or the state
court contorted the state law to fit the needs of the moment.
Either way, of course, one thing is certain: the two courts inevitably would not, and did not, agree.
IV.
As the First Circuit has noted, federal interpretation of state
law is a matter of necessity, not of superior ability.91 The federal
8

5 American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 119 F. 691 (5th Cir. 1902).

80 See, e.g., Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941);

Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1962).
87 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961).

88 92 So.2d 193 (Ala. 1921).
89 144 So.2d 25 (Ala. 1962), reo'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
00 Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 124 So.2d 441 (Ala. 1960).
01 Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125, 128, n.5 (1st Cir.

1962).
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courts are constantly being called upon to make difficult decisions,
and the possibility of knowing the answer in every instance is, of
course, nonexistent. In a case decided at the same time as Williams, the First Circuit had to make a highly difficult interpretation, without any real help from state decisions, concerning the
Rhode Island joint tortfeasors statute.92
In November, 1962, a fire and explosion damaged construction
site property owned by the Gilbane Building Company and the
Industrial National Bank. The New Amsterdam Casualty Company satisfied their claims and, as subrogee, sought indemnification
from four defendants: two subcontractors, Homans-Kobler and
O'Rourke, the architect, Holmes, and a materialman, Air-Lite.
The federal district court held that New Amsterdam had no right
to bring an action against the subcontractor O'Rourke as it had
also been an insured under Gilbane's and the bank's policy and
no fraud had been alleged. 93 O'Rourke then moved to dismiss
the cross-claims for contribution brought by the other defendants.
The district court granted the motion.94
The district court reasoned as follows: the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,95 passed to create a right of contribution which did not exist at common law, 6 declared that
"[t]he right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors." 7
However, the term "joint tortfeasors" was defined in the statute
as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has
been rendered against all or some of them."98 The court interpreted "liable in tort" as meaning that "there can be no contribution unless the injured person has a right of action in tort against
both the party who seeks contribution and the party against
whom contribution is sought."99 Since New Amsterdam, the
plaintiff, had no right of action against O'Rourke, O'Rourke could
92

R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 10-6-1 et seq. (1956, 1969 Reenactment).
93New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Homans-Kohler, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1017
(D.R.I. 1969).
94 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Homans-Kobler, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 374, 377

(D.R.I. 1970).
95
96 R.I.

GEN. LAWS ANN. § 10-6-1 et seq. (1956, 1969 Reenactment).

Hackett v. Hyson, 48 A.2d 353 (R.I. 1946).
97 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-6-3 (1956, 1969 Reenactment).
98 R.I.GEN. LAWs ANN § 10-6-2 (1956, 1969 Reenactment).
99 310 F. Supp. at 376.
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not be liable to the other defendants for contribution as a joint
tortfeasor.
The First Circuit found this reading of the statute too narrow.
It pointed out that in Zarella v. Miller" ° the plaintiff had been
barred from suit against one of two alleged negligent parties by
the rule of interspousal immunity, but that, nonetheless, contribution could be required from the immune but negligent
spouse. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Zarella framed the
question of liability in tort in terms of "culpability," therefore
procedural defenses to direct suit were irrelevant in passing
on contribution cross-claims. 1' 1 The federal court extrapolated
Zarellaby denying that "liable in tort" demanded "present liability
to whoever is the particular plaintiff," and held that when the
statute "speaks in terms of the 'same injury', this must be the
initial injury occasioned by the justly negligent parties and not
something definable in terms of who brings the suit."' 02
While the reasoning of the First Circuit is quite persuasive,
its decision was not necessarily an accurate reflection of what the
Rhode Island Supreme Court might have decided in a similar
case. If the federal district court read the statute narrowly, its
interpretation was certainly not indefensible. For instance, if
Gilbane had acted as its own insurer and had contractually
waived negligence suits against O'Rourke, it would be difficult
to say that O'Rourke was "liable in tort" to Gilbane. The only
difference is that in New Amsterdam there is an interposed thirdparty insurer, and the waiver of liability is read in by the law
of insurance. Also, Zarella can be read even more narrowly (if
pedantically) than the court of appeals viewed it; the negligent
spouse's liability in tort still persisted, despite the procedural
impossibility of bringing suit. O'Rourke was never liable to the
insurance company as a matter of substantive, not procedural,
law. In other words, the Rhode Island Supreme Court might well
have followed the line of reasoning espoused by the district court,
rather than that of the court of appeals.
100 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966).
101 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Holmes, 435 F.2d 1232, 1234 (1st Cir. 1970).
102 Id. The court distinguished its own decision in Newport Air Park, Inc. v.
United States, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cit. 1969), cited by the district court, explaining that it was bottomed on a legislative intent in the workmen's compensation
statute involved to override the general purposes of the contribution statute.
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Conclusion
The policy underlying Erie requires that state law litigants
achieve the same results regardless of whether they proceed in
federal or state court. Yet the two court systems will not always
interpret applicable state law in the same way. The federal
court, looking at state law, may find that the state decisions are
unclear or that the state courts have not spoken, and even settled
law may be overruled. Finally, federal courts may not find the
relevant state decisions or, having found them, may misinterpret
the cases. Therefore, in crucial cases, the litigant may indeed
hope to gain something by "forum-shopping." Erie's assumptions
may be based on an impractical hope of consistent interpretation,
and opponents of continued diversity jurisdiction are therefore
provided with yet another argument in the growing debate.

